

RAUL SAUCEDO

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- EDUCATION PhD, Philosophy. Cornell University, expected May 2009.
Dissertation: *Things, Places, and Possibilities: Metaphysical Essays*. [ABSTRACT BELOW]
Advisor: Matti Eklund.
- Visiting Student. UC Berkeley Philosophy Department, Fall 2006- Spring 2008.
- BA, Philosophy. UNAM (México), 2003.
Thesis: *Frege's Substantialist Semantics of Number-Words*.
Advisor: Mario Gómez-Torrente.
- AREAS OF
SPECIALIZATION Metaphysics, Philosophical Logic, Philosophy of Language.
- AREAS OF
COMPETENCE Early Modern Philosophy, Ethics, Confirmation Theory, Mathematical Logic.
- PUBLICATIONS "Parthood and Location"
Forthcoming in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*.
- PRESENTATIONS [NOT INCLUDING INTERNAL TALKS AT CORNELL]
- "Vague Composition and Cardinal Determinacy", Philosophy Department Colloquium, Western Washington University, April 2008.
- "Comments on Dan Korman's 'Naturalness, Eligibility, and the Case Against Particularism in Material-Object Metaphysics'", Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference—Carving Nature at its Joints, University of Idaho, April 2008.
- "Comments on Paul Audi's 'Toward a New Criterion of Identity for Properties'", APA Pacific Division Meeting, March 2008.
- "Parthood and Location", APA Eastern Division Meeting, December 2007.
- "Parthood and Location", Arché graduate conference, University of St. Andrews, November 2007.
- "Parthood and Location", UT Austin graduate conference, April 2007.
- "Parthood and Location", NYU/Columbia graduate conference, March 2007.
- "Persistence and Coincidence", Brown graduate conference, October 2006.

WORKS
IN PROGRESS

[DRAFTS AVAILABLE AT <http://people.cornell.edu/pages/rs339/papers.html>]

“Vague Composition at Logically Determinate Worlds”

“Principles of Modal Recombination”

“Persistence, Vagueness, Composition, and Partition”

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

AS COURSE INSTRUCTOR AT CORNELL:

Problems in Contemporary Ethics, Spring 2009 (scheduled).

Course website: <http://people.cornell.edu/pages/rs339/fws-s09.html>

The Nature of Reality, Fall 2008.

Course website: <http://people.cornell.edu/pages/rs339/fws-fo8.html>

AS TEACHING ASSISTANT AT CORNELL:

Introduction to Philosophy, Spring 2006. Instructor: Brian Weatherson.

Introduction to Philosophy, Fall 2005. Instructor: Tim Blaser.

Puzzles and Paradoxes, Spring 2005. Instructor: Benj Hellie.

Introduction to Logic, Fall 2004. Instructor: Brian Weatherson.

AS TEACHING ASSISTANT AT UC BERKELEY:

Probability and Induction, Spring 2008. Instructor: Branden Fitelson.

Course website: <http://www.fitelson.org/probability/>

Introduction to Logic, Fall 2007. Instructor: Branden Fitelson.

Course website: <http://fitelson.org/12A/>

GRADUATE
COURSEWORK

[ALL COURSES TAKEN AT CORNELL UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. † =_{df} AUDITED]

M&E (BROADLY CONSTRUED, INCLUDING LOGIC):

Metalogic (Michael Fara)

Philosophy of Perception (Benj Hellie)

Philosophy of Language[†] (Harold Hodes)

Metaphysics (Michael Fara)

Conditionals (Harold Hodes)

Frege and Russell[†] (Benj Hellie)

Set Theory (Harold Hodes)

Metaethics (Nick Sturgeon)

Philosophy of Language[†] (Zoltán Szabó)

Modal Logic (Delia Graff Fara)
Time and Tense (Zoltán Szabó and Dorit Abusch)
Mathematical Logic[†] (Anil Nerode, Cornell math department)
Tutorial on Metaphysics (Zoltán Szabó)
Composition and Persistence[†] (Mark Heller, Syracuse University)
David Lewis[†] (Brian Weatherson)
Model Theory[†] (Leo Harrington, UC Berkeley math department)

HISTORY:

Kant (Andrew Chignell)
The Empiricists (Nick Sturgeon)
The Rationalists (Andrew Chignell)
Aristotle (Christopher Taylor)

ACADEMIC
SERVICE

Referee for *Dialectica* (2008), *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (2007).

Session chair, 2007 and 2008 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Western Washington University.

Invited discussant, 2007 Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference—Metametaphysics, Boise State University.

At Cornell:

Graduate representative at the 2005-2006 faculty search committee. Duties included reviewing applications for two full-time faculty appointments at both the junior and senior levels, and discussing them with the rest of the committee and at faculty meetings.

Graduate representative at the 2004-2005 department colloquium committee.

PROFESSIONAL
AFFILIATIONS

American Philosophical Association

REFERENCES

Matti Eklund, Cornell University, me72@cornell.edu

Hud Hudson, Western Washington University, hud.hudson@wwu.edu

Jonathan Schaffer, Australian National University, jonathan.schaffer@anu.edu.au

Mark Heller, Syracuse University, heller@syr.edu

Branden Fitelson, UC Berkeley, branden@fitelson.org

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Things, Places, and Possibilities: Metaphysical Essays

My dissertation is concerned with a general issue in contemporary metaphysics: given that the material world is located in spacetime, how is the mereological structure of the material world related to that of spacetime? Is it metaphysically necessary that these structures perfectly align, or is it possible that they somehow mismatch? If they need not align, what sorts of disparities are possible? And, what, if anything, would any of this reveal about the nature of reality?

I address whether certain kinds of disparities—which haven't been discussed or even entertained in the literature—are possible, and discuss a few things we can learn from them about other debates in metaphysics. The sorts of mismatches I'm interested in are concerned with whether the mereological relations on some material objects and the mereological relations on the regions of spacetime at which those objects are exactly located may fail to mirror one another. Consider parthood, for instance. Is it possible that the exact location of a material thing, x , be part of the exact location of a material thing, y , but that x not be part of y ? Or is it possible that x be part of y but that x 's exact location not be part of y 's exact location? For another example, consider composition. Is it possible that the exact locations of some material things compose the exact location of a material object, but that those things fail to compose that object? Or is it possible that some material things compose a material object, but that those things' exact locations fail to compose that object's exact location?

These kinds of disparities—call them *mirroring disparities*—are not only more puzzling but also more general than others recently discussed by metaphysicians. The literature has concentrated on whether the mereological structure of a material object and that of its exact location may fail to correspond to one another. For instance, could an atomic material object (one with no proper parts) be exactly located at a non-atomic region, or a non-atomic object at an atomic region? Could a gunky material object (one with parts all the way down) be exactly located at a non-gunky region, or a non-gunky object at a gunky region? These sorts of mismatches focus solely on the mereological structure of a single material object and that of its exact location. By contrast, mirroring disparities focus on the mereological relations that may hold among any arbitrary plurality of material objects and among those objects' exact locations. So the kinds of mismatches that the literature has concentrated on are special cases of mirroring disparities.

I argue that the possibility of mirroring disparities follows from minimal and otherwise plausible assumptions about the nature of both mereological relations and relations of spatiotemporal location, together with a particularly weak and precisely stateable principle of modal recombination. This is in fact the main line of argument that has been offered in the literature for the possibility of any kind of mismatch between the mereological structures of the material world and spacetime. And since there's no non-*ad hoc* way to constrain the argument so that the possibility of only certain kinds of mismatch follows, it's hard to resist the possibility of mirroring disparities. For one would not only have to reject either the relevant combinatorial principle or one of the assumptions in place about mereology and location (neither of which, incidentally, is as attractive an option as one might think). One would also thereby undermine the main argument for the possibility of any kind of mismatch between the mereological structures of the material world and spacetime. That might be OK if one thinks that it's necessary that these structures perfectly align. But then the question is: what explains this seemingly brute necessity?

I also discuss a few consequences of accepting the possibility of mirroring disparities for other debates in metaphysics. I suggest, for instance, that they afford a version of endurantism that is compatible with unrestricted composition across time, and on which diachronic change may be explained without appeal to distributional properties or temporally indexed properties or instantiation. This version of endurantism is thus immune to both Sider's argument from vagueness and Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics for temporal parts. Another important consequence: I argue that mirroring mismatches allow for worlds where composition is vague but where existence, identity, and cardinality are not vague. This suggests a new way of defending vague composition against influential objections. More generally, it clarifies the connection between vagueness of mereology and vagueness of logic: the former doesn't require the latter.